India’s entire credit system hinges on a foreign-owned, collateral-obsessed idea of who deserves a loan. Until we replace it with a Bharat Credit Passport, the elephant will not dance — and unemployment will remain the real story of our times.
By Binod Anand — Secretary General, Confederation of NGOs of Rural India (CNRI); Founder, World Cooperative Economic Forum (WCOOPEF) & Member(Non-official) , High Power Committee on MSP and Agri Reforms , Govt. of India
7-8 Minute Read
- What is the Bharat Credit Passport? A proposed sovereign, publicly governed credit-information and scoring layer that converts an Indian’s real economic activity into a portable, recognised credit identity owned by the citizen.
- Are India’s credit bureaus foreign-owned? Among four RBI-licensed Credit Information Companies, two are US-controlled — TransUnion CIBIL (US), ) and Equifax (US); and two are European- CRIF High Mark is Italian-parented, and Experian is of Ireland origin.
- What does “credit-invisible” mean? People who earn regular, verifiable income but have no formal credit history, so lenders cannot assess them — an estimated 300–400 million Indians.
- How does this link to Viksit Bharat 2047? A developed India needs its producers to access capital on the strength of what they do; a blind, foreign-owned credit layer structurally caps growth and jobs.
Somewhere in India this morning a dairy farmer emptied three hundred litres into a cooperative chilling tank, a fisherman sold his night’s catch at the landing centre, and a weaver dispatched another consignment to a trader two districts away. Each of them is a producer. Each earns a stream of income that is regular, verifiable and, increasingly, digital. And each of them, in the eyes of the formal financial system, remains a blank page — economically productive, but financially invisible. The single reform that could change this is a Bharat Credit Passport: a sovereign, publicly governed credit-information and scoring layer that turns what an Indian actually does — the milk poured, the fish landed, the cloth woven, the UPI payments received — into a recognised, portable credit identity that belongs to the citizen and to the nation, rather than to a bureau headquartered abroad.
“To get credit you must already have had credit; to be seen, you must already have been seen.”
“We are lending enormous volumes without ever letting the borrower accumulate the one asset that would let them graduate — a credit history of their own.”
That last phrase is not a rhetorical flourish. It is the diagnosis. India’s credit architecture today rests on a borrowed principle, and it carries an unmistakable colonial hangover — on two levels at once.
“The first is a matter of plain ownership. Every lending decision in this country, from a metropolitan home loan to a self-help-group advance in a village, ultimately leans on the credit histories held by four Credit Information Companies — the bureaus we loosely and wrongly call our “rating agencies.” Of those four, three are controlled from outside India: TransUnion CIBIL by an American parent, Experian by an Ireland-domiciled multinational, and Equifax through a joint venture anchored in the United States. Only CRIF High Mark traces to a non-American owner, in Italy. Not one is a sovereign Indian institution.
The Reserve Bank of India’s registered credit information ecosystem is highly concentrated, with only four Credit Information Companies (CICs) holding Certificates of Registration: CRIF High Mark Credit Information Services Pvt. Ltd. (November 25, 2010), Equifax Credit Information Services Pvt. Ltd. (March 26, 2010), Experian Credit Information Company of India Pvt. Ltd. (February 17, 2010), and TransUnion CIBIL Ltd. (March 5, 2012). This structure has played an important role in standardising credit assessment in India, but it also raises a larger question: should India’s entire creditworthiness framework depend on a small number of predominantly private, commercially driven institutions and conventional credit histories? For a country aspiring to build a Viksit Bharat, the next generation of credit infrastructure may need to move beyond collateral and past borrowing behaviour toward a more inclusive, India-owned Bharat Credit Passport—one that recognises the economic potential, transactions, production, repayment capacity and livelihood activities of farmers, rural entrepreneurs, MSMEs and informal workers.
We would never contemplate handing the operation of Aadhaar’s identity database or UPI’s settlement engine to foreign-controlled private firms; yet the credit memory of more than a billion Indians — every repayment, every default, the raw material of who gets capital and who does not — is aggregated, scored and monetised on rails we neither own nor govern at the infrastructure level. For a country whose 2047 ambition is built on data-driven, cash-flow-based lending at population scale, this is a strange dependency to have accepted so quietly.”
The second level of the hangover is deeper and more damaging, because it is a hangover of the mind. The underwriting philosophy India imported wholesale from Western consumer finance holds that a person is creditworthy only if they can produce a documented history of formal borrowing and a stock of pledgeable collateral. In other words, to get credit you must already have had credit; to be seen, you must already have been seen. It is a beautifully circular, self-sealing logic — and for the propertied, salaried, form-filling minority it works. But layered onto an economy where the overwhelming majority earn in the informal, cash-and-digital grassroots, it becomes an instrument of exclusion that would have been perfectly familiar to a colonial financial administration: credit flows to those already inside the gate, and the mass of producers outside it are treated not as customers but as risk. This is the syndrome we must come out of. The question a modern Indian credit system should ask is not “what have you borrowed before?” but “what do you produce, and can I see it?”
To get credit you must already have had credit; to be seen, you must already have been seen. This is the syndrome we must come out of.
The scale of the invisibility is not anecdotal. In the analytical framework developed in earlier work, the gap is captured by an Economic-to-Credit Visibility Ratio — the ratio of a population’s economic participation to its formal credit visibility. Drawn from real secondary data across the Periodic Labour Force Survey, TransUnion CIBIL, the Reserve Bank and NABARD, that ratio sits somewhere between roughly two and three-and-a-half, implying an Economically Productive but Credit-Invisible population on the order of three hundred to four hundred million Indians. These are estimates offered as an order-of-magnitude signal pending a governed micro-data pilot, not a settled national statistic — but even at the conservative end, that is a working, earning, producing India the size of several European nations combined, that our lending system simply cannot perceive.
Consider what that invisibility does to the very people the state is trying hardest to reach. The Pradhan Mantri MUDRA Yojana is, by any measure, one of the largest micro-credit pushes in human history — well over fifty crore loans sanctioned since 2015, cumulative sanctions now crossing forty lakh crore rupees. And yet the striking texture beneath the headline is that the average MUDRA ticket has only recently touched about one lakh rupees, and the great bulk of accounts remain tiny Shishu loans. The money goes out; the borrower repays; and then — because that repayment builds no durable, portable credit identity that compounds over time — the same borrower returns to the counter next year as a stranger, starting over. We are lending enormous volumes without ever letting the borrower accumulate the one asset that would let them graduate: a visible, bankable credit history of their own. It is the difference between handing someone a meal and teaching the system to recognise that they can cook.
We are lending enormous volumes without ever letting the borrower accumulate the one asset that would let them graduate — a visible, bankable credit history of their own.
This is precisely why, despite the MUDRA push and a decade of financial-inclusion slogans, the great grey elephant of the Indian economy is still not dancing. The productivity leap and the employment surge that all this credit was meant to ignite have not arrived at the scale promised. India’s headline unemployment rate looks reassuringly low on the annual measure, but the number that matters — youth joblessness — stubbornly hovers near ten per cent on the official Periodic Labour Force Survey reading, and runs far higher for young people in our towns and cities, even as labour-force participation softens. Unemployment, not inflation or growth arithmetic, is the real and rawest issue of the moment. And a great deal of it is not a shortage of enterprise but a shortage of capital reaching enterprise — because the enterprise is invisible to the ledger.
Part of the reason is that too much of our grassroots credit delivery is still being run on the machinery of 1969. The Lead Bank Scheme and its familiar apparatus — the State Level Bankers’ Committees and District Level Bankers’ Committees, the district credit plans, the physical-branch targets — were designed in the era of bank nationalisation for an India of ledgers and queues. More than half a century later, our dairy farmers, fishermen, artisans and street vendors are still, in effect, hanging around those same SLBC and DLBC target-sheets, waiting to be counted in an annual plan rather than seen in real time. That model measures credit by disbursement targets pushed downward, not by the visibility of the borrower pushed upward. It was never built to recognise a fisherman by his catch records or a weaver by her order book, and it cannot be patched into doing so.
The encouraging truth is that India does not need to build the answer from scratch, because most of the scaffolding already exists — it simply has not been assembled into a sovereign whole. The Reserve Bank’s own Public Credit Registry, conceived by the Deosthalee task force back in 2018 as a state-owned registry of every credit contract in the country, is exactly the sovereign spine this vision needs, and deserves to be revived from its long stall rather than left as an unfinished intention. The Unified Lending Interface, now positioned as the third pillar of the JAM–UPI–ULI digital trinity and already live with dozens of lenders and well over a hundred data services, is the pipe through which land records, cash flows and activity data can finally reach the underwriter in real time. The Account Aggregator framework and NABARD’s digitised Kisan Credit Card rails already move consented financial data and have collapsed loan turnaround from weeks to under an hour. The pieces are lying on the table. What is missing is the connective layer that turns economic activity into recognised, portable creditworthiness under Indian public governance — and that layer is what the Bharat Credit Passport is meant to be.
Designed properly, it would do three things the four incumbent bureaus structurally cannot. It would see the invisible, by ingesting activity-augmented signals — cooperative payments, catch and mandi records, utility and rent histories, UPI inflows, self-help-group repayment behaviour — so that economic activity itself becomes a credit signal and the visibility ratio is compressed towards one. It would stay sovereign, by housing the core registry and the national scoring logic within public, Reserve-Bank-anchored infrastructure, auditable by Indian institutions and answerable to Indian law. And it would remain the citizen’s own, a passport the borrower carries and consents to rather than a file quietly held about them, governed by the discipline of the data-protection framework so that a system built to give the poor visibility never curdles into one that gives the state surveillance. Its outputs would need to be recognised where it counts — for Priority Sector Lending classification, for guarantee and refinance support, and for the accountability of the very SLBC and DLBC structures that must be dragged from the world of 1969 into the world of real-time data, with each function tied to a named institution rather than left to the fog of “the system will handle it.”
None of this is a technocratic nicety to be filed under financial-sector reform. The credit-information layer decides who participates in the formal economy at all. If it stays foreign-owned, our financial nervous system depends on infrastructure we do not control. If it stays blind to three or four hundred million producers, our growth is structurally capped at the fraction of India the ledger happens to see, and the jobs that fraction cannot generate show up, quarter after quarter, as youth unemployment. Viksit Bharat 2047 is, stripped to its essence, a wager that the ordinary Indian producer — the farmer, the fisherman, the artisan, the first-generation entrepreneur — can command capital on the strength of what they actually do. That wager cannot be won on an archaic, unaccountable, borrowed and largely foreign-owned grassroots credit architecture. It can be won on a credit ledger that is India’s own and that can, at last, see all of India. Build that, and the elephant will not merely lumber. It will dance.
The views expressed are personal.
https://voiceofruralindia.com/farmer-id-pmfby-agristack-leakage/
