A bargain born of scarcity · The geopolitical ground has shifted · The geo-economics have shifted further still · An asymmetry the nation can no longer afford · The real answer lies at home · Cooperation, on India’s terms · The sovereign choice
By Binod Anand ,Secretary General , Confederation of NGOs of Rural India & Founder Executive president , World Cooperation Economic Forum
The cooperation that helped feed a hungry nation in the last century cannot govern a food-surplus power in this one. The case for building indigenous research strength — and for placing foreign engagement on sovereign terms — has become compelling.India’s deep engagement with the international agricultural research system — the CGIAR network and the institutions it helped establish on Indian soil — has acquired precisely that character of unexamined permanence. The time has come to examine it. Not because the engagement was wrong when it began, but because the nation that entered into it, and the world in which it did so, have both been transformed beyond recognition.
A bargain born of scarcity
Recall the conditions of the founding. In the 1960s, India lived under the shadow of famine and the indignity of surviving on imported food aid — a dependency that scarred a generation of its leaders. The Green Revolution, drawing in part on wheat and rice varieties bred through international research, broke that trap and rewrote the nation’s relationship with hunger. Through the 1970s and 1980s, India welcomed international agricultural science as a partner in survival, and extended to its institutions the land, the privileges and the accommodations that the moment seemed to warrant.
Judged by the standards of its time, the bargain was sound. India was food-insecure, foreign exchange was scarce, its domestic research base was thin, and much of the technology it needed was held abroad. The country received germplasm, methods and capacity; the price, measured in asymmetric terms of engagement, appeared modest against the prize of self-reliance in staple grains. That arrangement was an act of necessity, and it served the nation well.
But an arrangement designed for scarcity cannot be treated as a permanent fixture by a nation that has since achieved abundance.
India today ranks among the world’s foremost producers and exporters of food. It is no longer a supplicant at the global table. When the founding premise inverts this completely, the terms of engagement cannot responsibly remain frozen in the decade that produced them.
The geopolitical ground has shifted
The 1980s belonged to a Cold War order in which agricultural knowledge travelled with relative freedom under the banner of development assistance, and in which India’s overriding anxiety was simply to feed itself. That order has passed.
The present is defined by multipolar great-power competition and a sharpening contest between the United States and China, in which nations increasingly treat what was once considered merely technical — seeds, genetic resources, farm data, research itself — as matters of national security.
Governments across the democratic world have moved to strengthen research-security regimes, to screen foreign funding of sensitive science, and to guard against dependencies on rivals and allies alike. Food and agriculture have become instruments of statecraft, leverage in a contested world.
India has meanwhile grown from an aid recipient into a rising power with a declared doctrine of strategic autonomy and its own expanding development partnerships across the Global South. A country that now aspires to help shape the international order cannot continue to run its most sensitive sector — the livelihood of hundreds of millions of its citizens — on an accountability model designed for the era when it received food aid. The geopolitical logic that once counselled openness now counsels sovereignty.
The geo-economics have shifted further still
If the politics have changed, the economics of agricultural research have changed more profoundly — and this is the transformation India has been slowest to absorb.
In the 1980s, value resided in the tangible: in seeds, agronomic packages and one-time technology transfer under conditions of want. Today the centre of gravity has migrated decisively to the intangible and the strategic — to data, intellectual property and the control of genetic resources. The most valuable yield of modern agricultural research is no longer a seed handed over once, but a continuous stream of granular intelligence: geotagged yields, input behaviour, harvest timing, household consumption, and remote-sensing maps of the nation’s grain and horticulture belts. In the data economy, whoever commands that intelligence commands the market it describes.
Three further currents deepen the stakes. Global agribusiness has consolidated into a handful of seed, agrochemical and machinery majors of formidable market power. Agriculture has been financialised, drawing in private capital that prizes early intelligence and deal flow. And supply chains themselves have been weaponised, as recent global shocks have demonstrated. In such a landscape India is no longer a case for charity — it is the prize itself: an immense market and an unrivalled reservoir of agricultural data. Arrangements that continue to cast it as a beneficiary of assistance, rather than as the owner of strategic assets, systematically undervalue what the nation is quietly giving away.
An asymmetry the nation can no longer afford
Set the two systems side by side and the difficulty is plain. India’s own institutions — the Indian Council of Agricultural Research and the state agricultural universities — operate under the full weight of democratic accountability: audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Right to Information, parliamentary oversight, and the discipline of Indian data and biodiversity law. International research bodies operating within India have historically enjoyed privileges and lighter obligations of disclosure, even as their funding base has shifted from intergovernmental grants toward philanthropic and corporate co-financing with commercial adjacencies in seeds, chemicals and data.
This is not an accusation of wrongdoing; it is a description of a structural imbalance that made sense under scarcity and makes none under surplus. India now possesses the legal architecture — the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, the Biological Diversity Act, and the distinctive protection that its Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights legislation affords to the right to save and exchange seed — to insist that a single standard of transparency, data governance and benefit-sharing binds everyone who operates in its agricultural research space. What has been wanting is not the law but the will to apply it uniformly.
There is a further reason the imbalance can no longer be indulged. A research relationship is never merely a transfer of technique; it carries within it a set of assumptions about which questions matter, whose problems deserve study, and which solutions count as progress. When that agenda is set, however subtly, by the priorities of distant funders, a nation risks organising its scientific effort around answers it did not choose to seek. For a country of India’s scale and ambition, the capacity to define its own research questions is itself a form of sovereignty — one that no amount of borrowed excellence can replace.
The real answer lies at home
De-risking begins with construction, not merely caution. The most important response to a changed world is a decisive investment in India’s own capacity to lead. A serious agenda for reforming ICAR would rest on several pillars.
It must be funded as the strategic asset it is. India’s agricultural research intensity remains well below the benchmark of one per cent of agricultural output that specialists have long urged, and stable, mission-mode budgets are the precondition for every other reform. It must retain its talent: the salary and career gap that draws the nation’s finest agricultural scientists toward international bodies and private laboratories is a slow haemorrhage that pay parity and scientific autonomy can staunch. It must be governed for speed and independence, freed from the bureaucratic drag that keeps able institutions from competing at the research frontier.
Above all, India must own its agricultural data — building sovereign, Indian-controlled data infrastructure, ideally held in trust for the farmers who generate it, so that the intelligence produced on Indian soil compounds Indian advantage rather than another’s. It must guard its genetic base through strengthened gene banks and the rigorous enforcement of benefit-sharing. And it must lead where its strengths already lie — in millets, in climate-resilient crops, in natural farming, and in cooperative-led value chains, arenas in which India can set the global agenda rather than follow it, and in which its cooperative movement can serve as a powerful engine of delivery.
Cooperation, on India’s terms
None of this argues for a theatrical rupture. It argues for the disciplined replacement of dependency with engagement that is selective, reciprocal and sovereign. India should cooperate where cooperation demonstrably serves India, and only on terms that India sets.
Open-ended arrangements should give way to time-bound, project-specific agreements carrying explicit terms on intellectual property, data residency and benefit-sharing. Every engagement should be conditioned on full disclosure of funding, on data localisation consistent with Indian law, on biodiversity clearances, and on the declaration of conflicts of interest where funders hold commercial stakes in the outcomes. The evidence that shapes national policy on prices, subsidies and seed law should be generated at home or independently validated, not imported from institutions whose backers have an interest in the result. Privileges and immunities should be subject to periodic review against each entity’s present character. And as Indian capacity matures, the nation should turn outward as a provider of science and a shaper of standards across the developing world — no longer the recipient of assistance, but its source.
The sovereign choice
The cooperation India embraced in the last century was the right choice for a food-insecure nation with few alternatives. To continue it unreformed, in a multipolar age in which data and genes are strategic assets and India stands as a food-surplus power, would be the wrong choice for a confident one. To reform ICAR so that it can lead, and to place foreign engagement on sovereign and conditional terms, is not hostility toward the world. It is the ordinary self-respect of a nation that intends to own its future.
A developed India cannot be built in agriculture upon foundations the nation does not control. The tools are at hand. What the moment demands is the resolve to use them.
